HPD Crime Lab Final Report Released Today!!!!

Here is the Final Report of the Independent Investigator for the Houston Police Department Crime Laboratory and Property Room. It is a PDF file. (You will need to download a free version of Acrobat Reader to read the file if you do not have this program already.)

Scroll to page 266 in your PDF viewer to begin reading the report's coverage of Nanon's case.

Excerpts from the Report on Nanon's case:

The Williams case was selected for more detailed review by our investigative
team because three HPD firearms examiners misidentified potentially significant fired bullet evidence. One of the HPD examiners provided incorrect testimony at trial based
on the misidentification. Critics have also asserted that HPD investigators contributed
to the misidentification because they failed to submit a weapon associated with the
crime to the Firearms Section for examination and test-firing before Mr. Williams’s trial.
To assess the conduct of the Crime Lab in connection with the Williams case we
reviewed information gathered during the HPD investigation, evidence presented at the
trial, and evidence developed during post-conviction proceedings. Our forensic experts
conducted an independent examination of the fired bullet evidence that was examined
by the Crime Lab for the Williams case. We also evaluated the significance of the Crime
Lab’s conclusions and testimony relating to the misidentified evidence.

.....

We believe that EB-1 was misidentified as a .25 caliber bullet because distortions
caused the bullet fragment to exhibit apparent similarities in class characteristics to
those of a .25 caliber bullet. That error was exacerbated by the subsequent submission
of EB-2, which, as we demonstrate above, had similar class characteristics. The failure
of HPD investigators to submit the .22 Magnum derringer to the Firearms Section with
a request to compare the bullet evidence to the firearm itself also contributed to the
misidentification.302 The misidentification was perpetuated because the Crime Lab
lacked appropriate quality assurance protocols at the time and during the years that
preceded ASCLD/LAB accreditation of the Lab. This case underlines the need to
strictly adhere to the revised protocol that was adopted in the period leading up to the
ASCLD/LAB accreditation.

We recognize, however, the unfortunate situation that existed where, based on the initial
misidentification, the investigators were operating on the assumption that a .25 auto caliber
weapon was involved in the homicide, not a .22 caliber firearm.

We disagree with Mr. Singer’s assertion that the recognition of EB-1 as a .22
Magnum caliber bullet should have been possible “even for a non-expert.” We note
that, absent the submission of the .22 derringer or any other suggestion that a .22 caliber
weapon may have been associated with EB-1 or EB-2, it would be possible to assume
that EB-1, a distorted bullet fragment, was similar to EB-2, a .25 caliber bullet. This is
especially true in this case because the recovery of a live round of .25 auto ammunition
at the scene of Mr. Collier’s murder reinforced that conclusion.

We believe that Mr. Davis reached the wrong conclusion partly because he had
only EB-1 available at the time of his examination. Additionally, Mr. Davis conducted
only a visual examination of EB-1; he did not perform a careful microscopic
examination. It is not uncommon for firearms examiners to determine class
characteristics with a cursory visual examination. However, deformation can change
the apparent class characteristics of a bullet or fragment, and a firearms examiner
should therefore conduct a careful microscopic examination.

We also agree with the results of Mr. Baldwin’s 1998 examination. The fact that
the Firearms Section did not reach these correct conclusions until several years after the
discovery of the evidence was not, in our view, caused by technical incompetence on
the part of Mr. Baldwin, who consistently demonstrated his competence in other cases
we reviewed. Rather, inadequacies in the Firearms Section’s policies were to blame for
the fact that the original error went undetected for so long.

In sum, we believe that the original error committed by Mr. Davis in 1992, which
was verified by Mr. Anderson in his 1995 report and further confirmed by Mr. Baldwin, was perpetuated by the lack of adequate quality assurance practices in the Firearms Section. HPD firearms examiners were apparently allowed to co-sign reports of other examiners without personally reviewing the evidence that was the subject of the report.

That practice was contrary to generally accepted forensic science principles and
obviated the purpose of secondary signatures on each report.
While the failure to correct Mr. Davis’s error before trial was unfortunate,
Mr. Baldwin’s revised findings and many other defense arguments have been presented
in great detail to three reviewing courts. Two of the three courts have concluded that
errors committed by examiners in the Crime Lab do not justify reversal of
Mr. Williams’s conviction, and the Williams case remains subject to ongoing review in
the federal courts. Additionally, Firearms Section polices and procedures have been
revised by the Crime Lab since the events described in this review. We believe that -- if
closely followed by HPD firearms examiners -- the updated policies and procedures
minimize the risk of mistakes like those that occurred in Mr. Williams’s case.